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Ahead of the 2022 Kenyan elections, Tchérina Jerolon looks at election related gender-
based violence in Kenya, the States response and why – despite the introduction of new
frameworks in response to the violence – the root causes must also be addressed for the
violence to really be tackled.
On December 10 , 2020, the High Court of Kenya delivered a landmark judgement in
favour of four female survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) committed
during the 2007-2008 post-election violence (PEV). Following an almost eight-year long
procedure, the Court found that the Government of Kenya was responsible for failing to
conduct independent and effective investigations and prosecutions of SGBV committed
by state agents and awarded each survivor compensation of KES 4 million. In the run-up
to the 2022 general elections, one question springs to mind: Can this judgement pave the
way to a deeper re ection on the underlying reasons why election-related sexual and




While Kenya has experienced election-related violence since the introduction of multi-
party politics in 1991, the scope and nature of the 2007-2008 PEV was unprecedented.
Within the weeks that followed the polls, thousands of civilians were victims of killings,
forced displacements, destruction of property, and sexual and gender-based violence.
SGBV included rape, gang rape, forced circumcision, partial or complete penile
amputation, among other crimes.
In their statement welcoming the Court’s judgement, the petitioners – eight survivors
along with four NGOs – declared that it “mark ed  the  rst time ever in Kenya that post-
election sexual violence has been legitimately recognized by the government”. This point
is essential. O cial recognition of the reality and various manifestations of politically
motivated SGBV is key. Why? For at least two main reasons.
First, in the context of the 2007-2008 PEV, o cial recognition can be seen as one of the
prerequisites to a deeper understanding of the structural and institutional factors that
permitted election-related SGBV. O cial recognition involves determining what exactly
has happened, to whom, by whom and why did it happen to these particular persons. It
can involve dispelling false narratives about the reality of SGBV and can also be essential
to trigger the design of prevention and reparation measures. Yet, until the High Court’s
decision, there had been no such a recognition, at the highest level of the State, despite
recurring demands from various actors.
Secondly, and if we now look at the prevalence of SGBV during the 2013 and 2017 general
elections, o cial recognition can be seen as a major step towards contributing to
breaking the pervasiveness of SGBV in Kenyan politics. Kenyan authorities, but also
political parties and the media, must now recognise the nexus that exists between the
desire to retain or conquer political power and the use of sexual and gender-based
violence as one of the means to achieve this goal.
They must also recognise that this particular form of political violence targets primarily
women. Failing to acknowledge this particularity of the political scene is failing to take
the necessary measures to ensure that women can exercise their right to freely
participate in the country’s political life (as voters, candidates, supporters, peaceful
demonstrators).
SGBV during the 2013 and 2017 general elections
Men and women are affected differently by political violence In the case of women – and
although we recognise that women do not form a homogeneous group and that their
experience may differ depending on various factors including their class, ethnicity and
perceived or real political a liation – political violence often manifests in a form of
gender-based oppression which aims at or tends to keep them away from the political
participation.
Drawing from the framework developed by Bardall, Bjarnegård and Piscopo to de ne
gendered political violence, we could argue that, in Kenya, the motive of such violence
against female politicians appears to be the preservation of hegemonic men’s control
over the political system and the resistance to women’s transgression of pre-determined
gender roles; the form of such violence can be physical and psychological and is often
sexualized in nature, including online; and the impact may include dissuading women
from participating in the public life or, when they are in o ce, compelling them to take
certain decisions.
Kenyan authorities, but also political parties and the
media, must now recognise the nexus that exists
between the desire to retain or conquer political power
and the use of sexual and gender-based violence as one
of the means to achieve this goal.
But what we also want to highlight is that in the Kenyan context, SGBV is also one of the
main forms of political violence used against “ordinary” women – and men – in particular
when elections lead to an outbreak of violence. Here also, the violence is often motivated
by a desire to exercise political dominance and power, including over certain
communities, and while the impacts may be diverse, they may include women’s
reluctance to participate into the electoral process.
In 2010, Kenya adopted a new Constitution which provides for a robust Bill of Rights and
introduces a “gender rule” by virtue of which “no more than two-thirds of the members of
elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender”. During the 2013 general
elections – in which the quota policy was applied for the  rst time – an increased number
of women were represented in Parliament and in the newly created County Assemblies.
These elections were the scene of unprecedented levels of violence against female
politicians, motivated by a strong opposition to the quota policy. Some female
candidates, elected or nominated, experienced attempted rapes and were called
“prostitutes”. Berry, Bouka and Kamuru described this situation as a “patriarchal backlash
against women, potentially undermining their gains by normalizing new forms of
oppression”.
In a recent study, the United Nations Human Rights O ce of the High Commissioner
(OHCHR), UN Women and Physicians For Human Rights (PHR) highlighted similar
patterns of violence during the 2017 general elections during which a large number of
female candidates experienced verbal and physical attacks and threats of sexual
violence. The authors further noted that according to some female candidates, the
threats often escalated to actual perpetration of election-related sexual violence. The
violence also targeted ‘ordinary’ women, in particular when the security situation
deteriorated in opposition strongholds. This was the highest level of election-related
violence reported since 2007-2008. The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
(KNCHR), which referred to sexual violence as a weapon for electoral-related con ict,
documented at least 201 persons, mostly women and girls, who were subjected to rape
and other forms of sexual violence, based on their perceived political a liation.
How can the High Court’s judgment contribute to the debate?
So far, the Government of Kenya has made no public statement on the High Court’s
judgment. Yet, this silence should not obstruct the necessary re ection on the reality and
various manifestations of election related SGBV, particularly ahead of the 2022 general
elections. Alongside recommendations that have already been put forward, including
within the aforementioned report from OHCHR, UN Women and PHR, the High Court’s
judgment can help foster this re ection and its subsequent call to action.
The Court con rmed the State’s responsibility to investigate and prosecute SGBV when
the violence is committed at the hands of its own agents. In doing so, the Court
contradicted the unconvincing State narrative according to which survivors have primary
responsibility to investigate and prove the crime. Multiple sources had indeed highlighted
the numerous obstacles that made it practically impossible for SGBV survivors to seek
accountability measures during situations of political unrest (these included procedural
limitations, lack of trust in the police, fear of further intimidation, humiliation or apathy
from police agents). The Court’s  nding could potentially pave the way to a deeper
re ection on the practical di culties that female politicians may also encounter when
they seek accountability for SGBV (including, for instance, when such violence is
committed online).
The Court con rmed the State’s responsibility to
investigate and prosecute SGBV when the violence is
committed at the hands of its own agents. In doing so,
the Court contradicted the unconvincing State
narrative according to which survivors have primary
responsibility to investigate and prove the crime.
By contrast, the Court declined the State’s responsibility when the violence is committed
by non-state actors and is not reported to the police. Here, a deeper contextual analysis
of the variety of ways in which election related SGBV may occur seems necessary for the
broader debate. Indeed, non-state actors may also be perpetrators, including sometimes
in collusion with State agents.
Will history continue to repeat itself?
The point here is not to state that nothing has been done to respond to the prevalence of
SGBV. On the contrary, and mainly due to the intense mobilisation of women’s rights
organisations and activists, Kenya has developed a robust legal and procedural
framework to prevent and punish sexual violence (with the Constitution, the Sexual
Offences Act, the National Guidelines on Management of Sexual Violence, among
others.). While this framework is to be welcomed, its effective implementation should be
part of a comprehensive approach that acknowledges the speci city of election related
SGBV, in particular against women, and that seeks to address it.
In its 2020-2024 National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, the Government of
Kenya indicated that “the increase in elective and public o ce positions has resulted in
more aggressive electoral processes that are not conducive to the effective participation
of women”. The NAP also referred to the “patriarchal nature of Kenyan society” seen as
encouraging the practice of forced marriage and contributing to “low level of participation
of women in decision making processes”. This is an important step. However, the NAP
does not explicitly highlight how political violence targets women in a distinct way and
does not make meaningful suggestions to address this challenge.
Yet, in order for the violence to be tackled, it has to be o cially recognised and named for
what it is, its root causes have to be identi ed, it has to be prevented, monitored,
denounced, and investigated. The responses must also include dismantling the unequal
power relations that exist between men and women. Otherwise, the risk is to normalise
election-related SGBV and to only see it as the unfortunate collateral damage of politics.
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center hotline which responds to violence against women in elections in Nairobi, Kenya,
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